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Dear Father Angelo,

Why is indirect abortion justified and not classified as voluntary in question?
What changes between indirect abortion and the other sins in which one is voluntarily involved?

Thank you and good evening,

A reader

Priest’s answer

Dear Reader,

1. Those that proceed from intellect and will are fully and typically human actions.

For this reason, with regard to the commission of a sin, it is said that there must be full awareness of the mind and deliberate consent of the will.

2. Human actions are called voluntary, depending upon the will.

In this regard, the distinction between voluntary direct and voluntary indirect is introduced.

We speak of voluntary direct when the action immediately aims, as an end or as a means, at achieving a specific objective.

For example: we pray and do a novena to obtain a certain grace, or propose to carry out an action that has, as direct effect, the death of our enemy.

3. We speak of voluntary indirect when an action is carried out from which several effects arise that are intimately connected to it; some of which have been foreseen and wanted (direct voluntary) or others have not, or they all have been foreseen but not wanted.

The classic example is that of drugs that are taken to remedy a certain disease and yet one is aware that there are related side effects that can be harmful. Such effects are by no means wanted, but are tolerated because there is no other remedy.

4. In order to be able to speak of voluntary indirect, four criteria are required. 

First: the action is supposed to be good in itself, or at least indifferent. Therefore it is never permissible to perform bad deeds as such, e.g. say or swear falsely, even if excellent effects can be obtained from them. The reason is that the end does not justify the means and one can never do evil to achieve good.

Second: first and immediate effect is supposed to be good, and not obtained through the bad one. The bad effect, despite being expected, just has to be tolerated. For example, the loss of consciousness following anesthesia is not directly wanted but only tolerated as an effect of one good or at least indifferent action, which is the one intended to numb the pain in sight of a serious surgical procedure. 

Third: there is a proportion between the good effect and the bad one, so that the bad effect is not greater than the good effect. In fact, the bad effect, even if it is not directly wanted, is always an evil, and cannot be tolerated if not to avoid a greater evil. 

Fourth: that it is the only way which means that the action is necessary at that moment and cannot be postponed. Included in this condition is the will to pursue only the good effect.

5. We speak of indirect abortion when neither the intention nor the act performed aim at abortion, but for another purpose, for example the elimination of a tumor in the mother’s head. This is an operation that would be performed even if the woman was not pregnant. But in our case she is pregnant and the surgeries and therapies can result in the involuntary loss of the baby. As it can be seen, the action does not aim at abortion but at a very specific good effect. Unfortunately, the loss of the child can be collateral, which is absolutely not wanted.

6. This intervention is morally lawful, if the action is carried out scrupulously following the principles of “indirect voluntary” or “double effect action”.

This is how Pius XII expressed himself in this regard: “We have always purposely used the expression “direct attempt” on the life of an innocent person, “direct killing”, because if, for example, the preservation of the life of the future mother, regardless of whether she is pregnant, urgently required an operation surgery or another therapy which would have, as a secondary consequence, in no way intended or pursued, but inevitable, the death of the fetus, such an act could no longer be qualified as an attempt directed at an innocent life. Under these conditions, the operation may be lawful, as would be similar medical interventions, provided that we are dealing with an asset of high values, such as life, and that it is not possible to postpone the operation until after the birth of the child, nor have to recourse to another effective remedy” (26.XI.1951).

7. Finally, there is also talk of a third type of volunteer: it is the so-called volunteer in question. According to moral theology, it is practically the same thing as the indirect voluntary. But generally such a term is used to indicate the responsibility of those who carry out an action with a double effect, putting themselves at risk of a bad effect greater than the good one. This is the case of a pregnant woman who wants to go skiing once again. But, falling, she loses the child. She is responsible for the loss of the child because the action was not necessary and the effect, even if it was averted, could have, somehow, been foreseen.

8. Coming therefore to the conclusion: one could say that indirect abortion is the same thing as an abortion in question. But it is preferable not to use the term abortion in question because there is no moral guilt in indirect abortion. While there may be in the voluntary case.

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to focus on these concepts.

I wish you well, bless you and remember you in prayer.

Father Angelo